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Abstract
Adversarial attack on question answering systems
over tabular data (TableQA) can help evaluate
to what extent they can understand natural lan-
guage questions and reason with tables. How-
ever, generating natural language adversarial ques-
tions is difficult, because even a single charac-
ter swap could lead to huge semantic difference
in human perception. In this paper, we propose
SAGE (Semantically valid Adversarial GEnera-
tor), a Wasserstein sequence-to-sequence model for
TableQA white-box1 attack. To preserve mean-
ing of original questions, we apply minimum risk
training with SIMILE and entity delexicalization.
We use Gumbel-Softmax to incorporate adversar-
ial loss for end-to-end training. Our experiments
show that SAGE outperforms existing local2 at-
tack models on semantic validity and fluency while
achieving a good attack success rate. Finally, we
demonstrate that adversarial training with SAGE-
augmented data can improve performance and ro-
bustness of TableQA systems.
1 Introduction
Question Answering on tabular data (TableQA) is the task
of generating answers to natural language questions given ta-
bles as extra knowledge [Pasupat and Liang, 2015; Zhong et
al., 2017; Cho et al., 2018, inter alia]. It has drawn increas-
ing attention in research. Compared to the standard question
answering task, TableQA reflects the real world situation bet-
ter: users interact with a QA system with natural language
questions, which requires the QA system to understand the
question and reason based on external knowledge in order to
provide the correct answer. State-of-the-art (SOTA) TableQA
systems are reported to have exceeded human performance
[He et al., 2019; Hwang et al., 2019]. Despite their impres-
sive results, an important question remains unanswered: Can
1White-box attack is the adversarial attack that can access the full
target system information such as parameter values and gradients,
compared with black-box attack where only model output is visible.
2We use the term local to represent a group of adversarial attacks
with word/subword/character level manipulation such as insertion,
deletion and substitution.
these systems really understand natural language questions
and reason with given tables, or do they merely capture cer-
tain statistical patterns in the datasets, which has poor gener-
alizability?
We leverage adversarial examples to answer this question,
as they have been proven to be useful for evaluating and im-
proving machine learning systems on various tasks [Jia and
Liang, 2017; Michel et al., 2019]. Adversarial examples
were first introduced to computer vision systems by inject-
ing small adversarial perturbations to the input to maximize
the chance of misclassification [Goodfellow et al., 2015].
This is because small perturbations on continuous pixel val-
ues does not affect the overall perception of human beings.
Most current works for producing semantic-preserving nat-
ural language adversarial examples [Ebrahimi et al., 2018;
Ren et al., 2019; Zhang et al., 2019] are constrained to local
attack models (§2.2) under the assumption that small changes
are less likely to lead to large semantic shift from the original
sentence. However, our experiments demonstrate that these
changes will impact language fluency or lead to noticeable
difference in meaning, which makes the generated adversar-
ial examples invalid.
In this paper, we propose SAGE (Semantically valid Ad-
versarial GEnerator), which generates semantically valid and
fluent adversarial questions for TableQA systems.
Main contributions of this paper include:
• We propose SAGE, a novel white-box attack model to
generate adversarial questions at the sentence level for
TableQA. To the best of our knowledge, this work is the
first attempt to bridge the gap between white-box adver-
sarial attack and text generation model for TableQA.
• SAGE is based on our proposed stochastic Wasserstein
Sequence-to-sequence (Seq2seq) model (Wseq). To im-
prove the attack success rate, it incorporates the adver-
sarial loss directly from the target system with Gumbel-
Softmax [Jang et al., 2017]. To tackle the problem of
semantic shift, we use delexicalization to tag the entities
in the original instances and employ the semantic sim-
ilarity score SIMILE [Wieting et al., 2019] to guide the
model to generate semantically valid questions.
• Through our experiments, we demonstrate that our ap-
proach can generate more fluent and semantically valid
adversarial questions than baselines using local meth-
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Table:
Rank Nation Gold Silver Bronze Total
1 Russia 2 2 2 6
2 France 1 0 0 1
2 Hungary 1 0 0 1
4 Ukraine 0 1 1 2
5 Bulgaria 0 1 0 1
6 Poland 0 0 1 1
Question: What is the bronze value associated with ranks over 5 ?
SQL query: SELECT Bronze WHERE Rank > 5
Answer: 1
Table 1: An example of WikiSQL dataset. Inputs to the TableQA
systems are shaded in gray.
ods (§2.2) while keeping high success rate (§4.1, §4.2).
Moreover, SAGE-generated examples can further im-
prove the test performance and robustness of the target
QA systems with adversarial training (§4.3).
2 Preliminary
2.1 Data and target system
Because of its well-defined syntax and wide usage, using
SQL query [Zhong et al., 2017] as the answer form for
TableQA has advantages over other forms, such as text string
[Pasupat and Liang, 2015] or operation sequence in table
look-up [Cho et al., 2018]. In this work, we use the Wik-
iSQL dataset [Zhong et al., 2017], which is one of the largest
TableQA datasets consisting of 24, 241 Wikipedia tables and
80, 654 pairs of human-edited question and SQL query (see
Table 1 for an example).
TableQA systems on WikiSQL are trained to generate
the SQL query and the final answer to a natural language
question on a single table using ONLY the table schema
(table header) without seeing table content [Zhong et al.,
2017]. The final answer is obtained deterministically by ex-
ecuting the generated SQL query on the corresponding re-
lational database. SOTA Wikisql systems [He et al., 2019;
Hwang et al., 2019] use pretrained representation models
such as BERT [Devlin et al., 2019] as encoder, and constrain
the output space of SQL query by casting text-to-SQL genera-
tion into many classification tasks predicting the slots of SQL
keywords and values for SELECT and WHERE columns.
They have achieved superhuman test performance on Wik-
iSQL with over 80% query accuracy (Q-Acc = #correct SQL#test example )
and about 90% answer accuracy (A-Acc = #correct answer#test example ).
2.2 Problem definition and local attack models
Given the table schema t and original question y, a TableQA
system is trained to predict the correct slots of the SQL query:
argmax
L∈L
p(L|y, t) = Ltrue
where L is the combined set of predicted labels and L is the
set of all possible label combinations.
Ideally, to attack this system, we want to generate an ad-
versarial question yˆ that is semantically valid compared to
LWseqLSim
Ladv
Target system
Wseq
Original 
question
Original
SQL
Table
schema
Figure 1: The model architecture of SAGE.
the original question, but can cause the system to output a
wrong answer:
argmax
L∈L
p(L|yˆ, t) 6= Ltrue s.t. yˆ semantic valid= y
We define semantic validity in the context of WikiSQL as
whether the generated question and the original one can be
expressed by the same SQL query. Maintaining semantic va-
lidity is a difficult task, therefore local attack models such as
token manipulation are widely used to limit semantic shift.
We apply three white-box local attack models [Ebrahimi
et al., 2018; Michel et al., 2019] as our local attack baseline
models, all of which can be formulated as searching the best
token embedding yˆi in the first order approximation of the
adversarial loss Ladv around the input token embeddings:
argmin
1≤i≤|y|,yˆi∈V
[yˆi − yi]T∇yiLadv(yˆ,Ltrue, t)
Ladv(yˆ,Ltrue, t) = −
∑
ltrue∈Ltrue
log(1− p(ltrue|yˆ, t)) (1)
which only requires one forward and backward pass to com-
pute the input token gradients. Specifically, the three local
attack models are: Unconstrained, which searches yˆi within
the whole embedding space of V; kNN, which constraints the
search space within 10 nearest neighbors of the original token
embedding; and CharSwap, which swaps or adds a character
to the original token yi and changes it to <unk>.
3 Semantically valid adversarial generator
In this section, we describe SAGE. Figure 1 illustrates its
main architecture with the losses of three main components.
SAGE takes the meaning representation of the question, i.e.
SQL query, as input and aims to generate semantically valid
and fluent adversarial questions that can fool TableQA sys-
tems without changing the gold-standard SQL query.
We discuss the three main components of SAGE in detail:
1) Stochastic Wasserstein Seq2seq model (Wseq) used for
question generation (§3.1); 2) Delexicalization and minimum
risk training with SIMILE [Wieting et al., 2019] to enhance
semantic validity (§3.2); 3) End-to-end training with adver-
sarial loss from the target system using Gumbel-Softmax
[Jang et al., 2017] (§3.3).
3.1 Stochastic Wasserstein Seq2seq model (Wseq)
Wseq is based on Seq2seq model with attention and copy
mechanism [Luong et al., 2015; See et al., 2017]. We encode
the input SQL query x = (x1, x2, ..., x|x|) with a one layer
bidirectional gated recurrent unit (GRU) [Cho et al., 2014],
and the latent representation of the whole SQL sequence, i.e.
the last hidden state z = [
−→
h |x|;
←−
h 1] is used to initialize the
hidden state of the decoder, which is another one layer GRU.
During each step of decoding, we apply general global atten-
tion [Luong et al., 2015] and copy mechanism [See et al.,
2017], then output the predicted token with a Softmax distri-
bution.
Seq2seq model encodes SQL query into a deterministic
latent representation z, which can potentially lead to poor
generalization during inference. When an unseen SQL is
encoded to a new z, the deterministic Seq2seq model can
output nonsensical or unnatural questions from such un-
seen z, even if it is very close to a training instance [Bow-
man et al., 2016], which could negatively impact the flu-
ency of the generated questions. Recent advance in deep
generative models based on variational inference [Kingma
and Welling, 2013] have shown great success in learning
smooth latent representations by modeling z as a distribu-
tion to generate more meaningful text [Bowman et al., 2016;
Bahuleyan et al., 2019]. To improve the fluency of the gener-
ated questions, we thus propose the new Wseq model based
on Wasserstein autoencoder [Tolstikhin et al., 2018], which
has been shown to achieve more stable training and better
performance than other variational models [Bahuleyan et al.,
2019]. Specifically, Wseq models z as a Gaussian distribution
conditioned on the input x:
q(z|x) = N (µ, diagσ2)
µ =Wµ[
−→
h |x|;
←−
h 1] + bµ
logσ =Wσ[
−→
h |x|;
←−
h 1] + bσ
The training objective is to minimize the expected re-
construction loss regularized by the Wasserstein distance
Dz(q(z), p(z)) between the aggregated posterior q(z) and a
normal prior z ∼ N (0, I):
J = −Ep(x,y)Eq(z|x,y)[log p(y|z,x)] +Dz(q(z), p(z))
, −Ep(x,y)Eq(z|x)[log p(y|z,x)] +Dz(q(z), p(z))
by assuming y = y(x), i.e. y is a function of x in varia-
tional encoder-decoder [Zhou and Neubig, 2017]. We use the
maximum mean discrepancy (MMD) with the inverse multi-
quadratic kernel k(x, y) = C
C+‖x−y‖22 as Dz. During train-
ing, we sample z from p(z|x) and approximate MMD with
the samples in each mini-batch, so the loss function for each
batch can be written as
LWseq = −
∑
(x,y)∈B
|y|∑
t
log p(yt|z,y<t,x) + λWseqDˆz(q(z), p(z))
Dˆz(q(z), p(z)) =
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i 6=j
k(zi, zj)
+
1
n(n− 1)
∑
i6=j
k(z˜i, z˜j)− 2
n2
∑
i,j
k(zi, z˜j)
where n is the size of the batch B, z˜ is sampled from the
posterior q, z is sampled the prior p, and λWseq > 0 is a hy-
perparameter controlling the degree of regularization.
3.2 Enhancing the semantic validity (Wseq-S)
To enhance the semantic validity of the generated questions,
we introduce entity delexicalization to improve the sentence
level entity coverage rate and employ SIMILE in minimum
risk training to improve the semantic similarity between the
generated and the original questions.
Entity delexicalization If a generated question does not
contain all the entities in the WHERE columns of the SQL
query, it cannot be semantically invalid, because all current
TableQA systems rely on entity information to locate the
correct cells in table to perform reasoning. To address this
problem, we delexicalize the entities appearing in WHERE
columns of the SQL query and its corresponding question in
WikiSQL. We replace entities with et i to denote the i-th
entity in the query/question. Delexicalization can dramati-
cally reduce the length of the entity tokens our model needs
to predict and improve the entity coverage at sentence level.
Minimum risk training with SIMILE How to preserve the
original semantics is the main challenge in natural language
adversarial attacks. While including human judgement in the
loop is beneficial [Jia and Liang, 2017], it is expensive and
time consuming. Instead, we opt for SIMILE [Wieting et al.,
2019], an automatic semantic similarity score between two
sentences to guide our model training, which correlates well
with human judgement. SIMILE calculates the cosine similar-
ity between embeddings of two sentences trained on a large
amount of paraphrase text [Wieting and Gimpel, 2018]. We
choose SIMILE over string matching based metrics, such as
BLEU [Papineni et al., 2002], because our generated ques-
tion can be very different in lexical or syntactic realizations
from the original question while keeping high semantic sim-
ilarity. In order to incorporate SIMILE into our model, we
follow [Wieting and Gimpel, 2018] and apply minimum risk
training [Shen et al., 2016] on a set of generated questions,
i.e. a hypothesis set H(x), to approximate the whole gener-
ated question space given the SQL query x:
Lsim(x,y) = Ep(h|x)[1− SIMILE(y,h)]
,
∑
h∈H(x)
(1− SIMILE(y,h)) p(h|x)∑
h′∈H(x) p(h′|x)
3.3 End-to-end training with adversarial loss
In order to apply white-box attack, we employ end-to-end
training by sending the generated questions to the target
system and back-propagate the adversarial loss through our
model. The adversarial loss from the TableQA system, shown
in Equation 1, maximizes the probability of the target sys-
tem making incorrect predictions. However, it is not possible
to directly back-propagate the adversarial loss to our attack
model through the discrete question tokens which are gen-
erated by operating argmax on Softmax. To overcome the
issue, we adopt the Gumbel-Softmax [Jang et al., 2017] to
replace Softmax:
p(yi) =
exp((log(pii) + gi)/τ)∑|V|
j exp((log(pij) + gj)/τ)
BLEU METEOR SIMLE Ecr (%) Qfr (%) Afr (%) Perplexity
Original Questions - - - - - - 816
L
oc
al Unconstrained 79.26 51.93 87.35 100 49.46 41.23 1596
kNN 80.39 56.03 93.30 100 23.80 18.23 1106
CharSwap 80.76 53.91 90.51 100 26.10 22.09 2658
Se
q2
se
q-
ba
se
d Seq2seq w/o delex 32.69 35.77 80.09 68.97 12.62 11.25 515
Seq2seq 34.91 37.58 82.79 99.38 8.98 6.69 561
Wseq (ours) 33.72 37.70 82.18 98.91 8.37 6.91 474
Wseq-S (ours) 36.05 37.94 84.32 99.46 7.76 6.14 610
SAGE (ours) 33.54 36.35 82.38 99.11 17.61 14.46 710
Table 2: Automatic evaluation metrics on WikiSQL test set for generated adversarial questions. Delex represents entity delexicalization. Ecr,
Qfr and Afr represent sentence level entity coverage rate, query and answer flip rate. The best scores for Seq2seq-based models are in bold.
where pii is the probability after Softmax for token i in the
output vocabulary with size |V|, gi is the Gumbel(0, 1) distri-
bution sample, and τ controls the smoothness of the distribu-
tion. We still use argmax to discretize yt at each time step
during generation, but approximate the backward gradients
with the Straight-Through (ST) [Bengio et al., 2013] Gumbel
estimator to enable end-to-end training.
Finally, for each batch, SAGE combines the losses of pre-
vious three components all together:
L = LWseq +
∑
(x,y)∈B
[λsimLsim(x,y) + λadvLadv(yˆ,L(y))]
where λsim and λadv are hyperparameters. It takes the text flu-
ency, semantic validity, and the adversarial attack into con-
sideration.
4 Experiments
In this section, we use the publicly released SQLova [Hwang
et al., 2019] with BERT large encoder as our target system,3
because the techniques used in SQLova are representative of
the SOTA TableQA systems on WikiSQL and it is also one of
the best performing systems. However, it should be noted that
our method can be applied to any other differentiable target
systems as well.
4.1 Automatic evaluation
We evaluate the generated questions in three aspects: seman-
tic validity, flip rate, and fluency.
Semantic validity As discussed in §3.2, the generated ad-
versarial questions can only be semantically valid if they con-
tain all required entities and preserve the original meaning of
questions. We use sentence level entity coverage rate and se-
mantic similarity to evaluate these two criteria. Sentence level
entity coverage rate (Ecr) is defined as the ratio between the
number of generated questions with all required entities (v)
and the total number of generated adversarial questions (m):
Ecr = v/m. To measure semantic similarity, We use BLEU,
METEOR [Banerjee and Lavie, 2005] and SIMLE. BLEU
is based on exact n-gram matching, so it does not give any
credit to semantically similar sentences different in lexical
3We use the released version without execution-guided decoding
at https://github.com/naver/sqlova.
realizations. METEOR computes the unigram matching F-
score using stemming, synonymy and paraphrasing informa-
tion, allowing for certain lexical variations. SIMLE is the only
embedding-based similarity metric free from string matching.
Flip rate WikiSQL systems are evaluated with both query
accuracy and answer accuracy (§2.1). Correspondingly, we
use query flip rate (Qfr) and answer flip rate (Afr) to measure
the attack success of our generated questions. Out of v valid
adversarial questions, l questions cause SQL query error and
a for answer error, so Qfr and Afr can be calculated as:
Qfr =
l
m
Afr =
a
m
Fluency We want the generated questions to be fluent and
natural. Following [Dathathri et al., 2020], we use GPT-2
based Perplexity [Radford et al., 2019] as an automatic eval-
uation metric for fluency. Fluency is different from semantic
validity, because if a generated question differs in meaning
from its original question (not semantic valid), it can still be
completely fluent to humans.
We compare SAGE with two groups of baselines. The first
group comprises the three local attack models discussed in
§2.2. For fair comparison with SAGE, which employs entity
delexicalization, we mask entity tokens during local attack so
that all the entities in the original question will be preserved.4
The second group includes Seq2seq-based models, i.e., the
deterministic Seq2seq models with and without entity delex-
icalization, as well as ablated SAGE models.
Table 2 shows the results of automatic evaluation. Since lo-
cal models only make changes to a single token, compared to
Seq2seq-based models, they can easily achieve much higher
scores in BLEU and METEOR, which are based on string
matching. However, such gap is reduced significantly be-
tween local and Seq2seq-based models in SIMLE. This sug-
gests that although questions generated by Seq2seq-based
models are different in textual realization from the original
questions, the semantic meaning is greatly preserved. Since
SIMLE is still based on the bag-of-words assumption that ig-
nores syntactic structure, local models inevitably have higher
4Local attack models without entity masking has comparable
scores in BLEU, METEOR, SIMLE and perplexity, but much worse
Ecr, Qfr and Afr, e.g. 24.47 Qfr for Unconstrained compared to
49.46 in Table 2.
Validity (%)↑ Fluency (rank)↓
Original Questions - 2.2
Unconstrained 20.3 4.39
kNN 64.0 3.39
Seq2seq w/o delex 78.7 2.99
Seq2seq 89.3 2.56
Wseq (ours) 88.7 2.42
Wseq-S (ours) 90.3 2.61
SAGE (ours) 78.7† 2.71‡
†: Significant compared to kNN (p < 0.01).
‡: Significant compared to kNN (p < 0.01) and Seq2seq w/o delex
(p < 0.05).
Table 3: Human evaluation results on 100 questions per task from
each model. Validity is the percentage of semantically valid ques-
tions. Fluency is the mean rank of each model over sampled ques-
tions. The best scores are in bold. The Fleiss’ Kappa for inter-
annotator agreement is 61.0, which falls in the interval of substantial
agreement.
scores than those generated by Seq2seq-based models from
scratch, which contain more significant lexical and syntactic
variations. We argue that these variations are beneficial be-
cause they mimic the diversity of human language.
The flip rates should be read together with perplexity,
as our goal is to generate fluent adversarial questions. As
demonstrated in the table, local models tend to achieve high
flip rates by generating non-fluent or nonsensical questions
that rarely appear in natural language. This is further con-
firmed in human evaluation (§4.2).
Among the Seq2seq-based models, Wseq-S performs the
best in terms of semantic validity whereas Seq2seq (w/o
delex) ranks the worst. This demonstrates the effectiveness
of entity delexicalization and minimum risk training with
SIMLE in enhancing semantic validity.
SAGE achieves the highest flip rates outperforming all of
the Seq2seq baselines, with a 9.85 absolute Qfr increase over
Wseq-S. It indicates that SAGE is better at adversarial attacks
to the target system, compared to Wseq and Wseq-S. How-
ever, this is at the cost of sacrificing semantic validity, which
suggests that the objectives of adversarial loss and semantic
validity are not perfectly aligned.
Wseq is our most fluent model that keeps a good balance
between semantic validity and fluency, achieving the best
perplexity while maintaining comparable similarity scores to
other Seq2seq-based models.
4.2 Human evaluation
Due to the limitations of automatic metrics in evaluating se-
mantic validity and fluency, we introduce human evaluation
to substantiate our findings. We sample 100 questions from
the WikiSQL test set and recruit three native expert annotators
to annotate the adversarial examples generated by each model
in the tasks of semantic validity and fluency. Here we focus
on the Seq2seq-based models as well as the best-performed
local attack models from Table 2.
Semantic validity It is extremely difficult and error prone
to require annotators to write the corresponding SQL query
AdvData-B AdvData-L
Q-Acc A-Acc Q-Acc A-Acc
Before Aug. 79.0 84.5 79.0 84.5
+30k 79.5 85.2 79.3 85.0
+56k 79.4 85.5 79.6 85.3
Table 4: WikiSQL test accuracy before and after data augmentation
on SQLova with BERT base encoder (SQLOVA-B). Q-Acc and A-
Acc denote query and answer accuracy. AdvData-B and AdvData-
L are adversarial examples generated using two different target sys-
tems, SQLova-B and the released SQLova with BERT large encoder.
Before Aug. AdvData-B AdvData-L
Attack model Qfr Afr Qfr Afr Qfr Afr
Unconstrained 53.97 46.07 53.46 45.15 51.01 43.26
kNN 27.36 21.85 25.29 19.83 25.57 20.51
SAGE 16.55 12.31 10.30 8.09 14.21 12.19
Table 5: Test flip rates before and after data augmentation.
for generated and original questions to measure semantic va-
lidity. Instead, we ask the annotators to make a binary de-
cision on whether the generated and original question have
the same query process given table, i.e. whether they use the
same columns and rows of the table for the same answer.
According to human evaluation (as shown in Table 3), our
models substantially outperform the local models in terms
of semantic validity. For example, 90.3% of the gener-
ated questions of our Wseq-S are semantically valid, forti-
fying the effectiveness of entity delexicalization and SIMILE.
Also, all Seq2seq-based models achieve higher semantic va-
lidity than the local models. It demonstrates the capability
of Seq2seq-based models in generating more semantically
equivalent questions. Although local models only introduce
minor word-level changes, most of them actually greatly al-
ter the meaning of the original questions and make the gener-
ated adversarial questions semantically invalid. Additionally,
it suggests that existing automatic metrics are not sufficient to
evaluate semantic validity. On the other hand, SAGE scores
lower than Wseq-S and Wseq in terms of semantic validity.
However, given its high flip rates, SAGE still generates many
more semantically valid adversarial questions than any other
Seq2seq-based model.
Fluency To compare the fluency of generated questions by
each model, we follow the practice of [Novikova et al., 2018]
and ask annotators to rank a set of generated questions in-
cluding the original one in terms of fluency and naturalness.
We adopt ranking instead of scoring in measuring fluency,
because we care more about comparison of the models than
absolute scores. To facilitate annotation, we additionally pro-
vide a coarse-grained three level guideline to the annotators.
Table 3 shows that Seq2seq-based models outperform lo-
cal models markedly in fluency. Similar to automatic fluency
evaluation (perplexity), Wseq tops all models in human eval-
uation, which only ranks behind the original question by a
small margin. This verifies that Wseq is effective in improv-
ing generation fluency. SAGE yields good fluency, which
is significantly better than the Seq2seq model without entity
delexicalization. The decrease in fluency from SAGE com-
Question SQL H
Se
m
an
tic
V
al
id
ity
What is the sum of wins after 1999 ? (Original) SELECT SUM(Wins) WHERE Year > 1999 -
What is the sum of wins downs 1999 ? (Unconstrained) X N
What is the sum of wins after 1999 is (kNN) SELECT Wins WHERE Year > 1999 N
How many wins in the years after 1999 ? (Seq2seq) X Y
What is the total wins for the year after 1999 ? (Wseq) X Y
What is the sum of wins in the year later than 1999 ? (Wseq-S) SELECT COUNT(Wins) WHERE YEAR > 1999 Y
How many wins have a year later than 1999 ? (SAGE) SELECT COUNT(Wins) WHERE YEAR > 1999 Y
Fl
ue
nc
y
What was the date when the opponent was at South Carolina ? (Original) SELECT Date WHERE Opponent = at South Carolina 3.0
What was the date when the jord was at South Carolina ? (Unconstrained) X 5.3
What was the date when the opponent was at South Carolina , (kNN) X 4.0
What date was the opponent at South carolina ? (Seq2seq) X 1.3
What is the date of the game against at South Carolina ? (Wseq) X 4.7
What is the date of the opponent at South Carolina ? (Wseq-S) X 4.0
On what date was the opponent at South Carolina ? (SAGE) X 1.7
Table 6: Examples of generated questions with human annotations (H). Substituted tokens in local models are in bold. X means the model
predicted SQL is the same as the original SQL. A generated question is considered semantically valid if at least two annotators select Yes
(Y). For fluency, we show the average rank from all three annotators (the lower the better).
pared to Wseq are caused by two reasons: (1) Adding the ad-
versarial loss harms text quality; (2) SIMILE drives the model
to generate questions closer to the original ones, which in-
creases semantic validity but sacrifices fluency, which is the
same case in Wseq-S.
Overall, human evaluation confirms the advantage of
Seq2seq-based models over local models in both semantic va-
lidity and fluency.
4.3 Adversarial Training with SAGE
We augment training data for TableQA systems with SAGE-
generated adversarial examples, then test the performance
and robustness of the retrained systems.
Specifically, we train a SQLova system with BERT base
encoder (SQLova-B) on account of efficiency. This is dif-
ferent from the released SQLova system with BERT large
encoder. We then use SAGE to attack both SQLova-B and
released system and generate two sets of adversarial exam-
ples, AdvData-B and AdvData-L. We retrain SQLova-B us-
ing the original training data augmented with 30k and the full
(56k) adversarial examples from AdvData-B and AdvData-
L, respectively. Table 4 shows that adding SAGE-generated
adversarial examples improves the performance of SQLova-
B on the original WikiSQL test data. Although AdvData-L is
not targeted for SQLova-B, it can still boost the performance
of SQLova-B.
We further attack the two retrained SQLOVA-B systems
augmented with full adversarial examples using different at-
tack models. Table 5 demonstrates both AdvData-B and
AdvData-L can help SQLova-B to defend various attacks,
with all flip rates decreased.
In summary, SAGE-generated adversarial examples can
improve the performance and robustness of TableQA sys-
tems, regardless which target system is used for generation.
5 Qualitative Analysis
We study some generated examples and analyze SAGE quali-
tatively with the help of model output and human evaluations
in Table 6. In the first example, adversarial questions gen-
erated by either local model are semantically invalid, show-
ing their limitation in meaning preservation, especially when
the local edit happens at content words. On the contrary,
Seq2seq-based models generate questions from the continu-
ous semantic space, which can incorporate more lexical and
syntactic variations. In particular, SAGE is able to generate
questions that are both semantically valid and challenging to
the target system.
The second example demonstrates the low fluency of local
models, due to the occurrence of nonsensical word or inap-
propriate punctuation. Questions from Seq2seq-based mod-
els are generally more meaningful and fluent. Wseq and
Wseq-S can generate very fluent questions, except for the
prepositional phrase entity “at South Carolina”. This is be-
cause by default all delexicalized entities from the SQL query
are inferred to be proper nouns. However, SAGE manages to
bypass this pitfall by using another syntactic structure. Addi-
tionally, when comparing Wseq-based models, the word “op-
ponent”, which is used by the original question, is generated
by models with SIMILE but not plain Wseq. This suggests
that the SIMILE loss is encouraging the model to generate
words coming from the original question, which gives us a
hint on the relatively low fluency of Wseq-S in §4.2.
6 Conclusion
We proposed SAGE, a Wasserstein Seq2seq model with en-
tity delexicalization and semantic similarity regularization, to
generate white-box adversarial questions for TableQA sys-
tems. We include the adversarial loss with Gumbel Softmax
in training to enforce the adversarial attack. Experiments
showed that our model is effective in consolidating seman-
tic validity and fluency while maintaining high flip rates. The
generated adversarial examples can promote better evaluation
and interpretation for TableQA systems. Moreover, our re-
sults demonstrated that they can improve TableQA systems’
performance in question understanding and knowledge rea-
soning, as well as robustness towards various attacks.
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